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NOTES AND COMMENT
to permit such uncertainty in the law, especially since the determina-
tion of the issues is often left to the mercy and discretion of one
deciding judge. By this we do not mean to indicate that we believe
that the judges wilfully disregard the law. We believe, as do so
many others, that " * * * the Court is a human institution; that it has
the fallibility of a human institution; that each of its members has his
human limitations, his strength and his weaknesses; each has his own
political, social and economic philosophies, some of them avowed and
which are sought to be controlled and others entirely subconscious
but woven into the very texture of his being." 52
Constitutional Amendments, seeking to extend the control of the
government over the social and economic life of the nation, are now
being proposed on all sides. Since the ultimate fate of such Amend-
ments would depend upon the construction put upon them by the
Supreme Court, we cannot say that this alone would solve the prob-
lem. We would suggest that in addition to such Amendment, provi-
sion should be made that no state or federal statute should be held
unconstitutional save by a vote of two-thirds of the membership of
the Court, and that such questions should be promptly submitted to
the Supreme Court itself, without prior submission to the lower
federal courts.5 3
Louis H. RUBINSTEIN.
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION: THE OUTLOOK FOR ITS
COSTITUTIONALITY IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
Proportional representation is an attempt to realize an equitable
representation of sizeable political constituencies in city councils.
There are many different plans which aim at this; but the "most
carefully devised and promising system" of proportional representa-
' Stated by Bernard L. Shientag, Justice of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York in Book Rev. (1936) 10 ST. JoEN's L. REv. 382, quoting
CARDOzo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 168, wherein it is
said, "The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn
aside in their course and pass Judges by."
' See Book Rev. (1936) 10 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 385. See also N. Y. Times,
June 28, 1936, p. 16L, col. 3, where Prof. Cohen suggests giving Congress power
to pass Constitutional Amendments by a majority vote of both Houses, coupled
with a clear-cut provision stripping the courts of the power to nullify legisla-
tion. He is here quoted as saying, "I think it would be safer for the people
to be at the mercy of their representatives than at the mercy of a majority of
one in a court whose members frequently are not familiar with the facts of the
issue on which they are voting."
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tion yet tried is the Hare Plan.' This is proportional representation
properly so-called.
1MAcDONALD, AmERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (1929)
p. 195. The Hare Plan or "proportional representation with the single trans-
ferable vote," is intended "to give representation in a legislative body to
every group in general thinking alike on political subjects which is consid-
ered large enough to deserve representation." The quantity of representation
for each group is to be in direct proportion to its numerical strength. The
plan is especially devised for election to assemblies or other bodies where
there are three or more persons to be elected, each of equal rank with the
others.
Under this system each voter receives a ballot containing the names of
all the candidates for the council. The names are printed in a single ver-
tical column, and the voter is told to indicate his first choice by placing a
figure 1 after the candidate's name; his second choice may be expressed by
a 2, his third by a 3, and so on down the line without regard to the number
of persons to be elected. The voter can express only one first choice; if
the figure 1 is put opposite more than one name the ballot is voided.
After the polls are closed the ballots are taken to some central point to
be counted; the invalid ballots are then thrown out. Then each candidate's
valid first choices are put into separate packages. The "quota" or minimum
number of votes sufficient to elect a candidate is determined. It is well to
observe at this point that if the quota is fixed in advance the number of
councilmen will vary according to the amount of valid votes cast at each
election. The proposed revised New York City Charter provides that one
councilman shall be elected for each 75,000 valid votes cast in each borough
with an additional councilman for a remainder of 50,000 valid votes.
In the so-called "off years" the number of councilmen may be less than
during a major election year. However, in those cities in which the Hare
Plan has been adopted the size of the council has been definitely fixed and
the quota is determined after each election. Such a quota is known as the
"variable quota." This quota is determined by dividing the number of offices
to be filled, plus one, into the total number of valid votes cast, and taking
the next higher whole number. For example, if there is a council of nine
to be elected and 100,000 valid votes are cast, nine plus one makes ten and
this into 100,000 gives 10,000, the next higher whole number is 10,001, so
10,001 is the quota.
Any candidate who receives 10,001 votes is declared elected. But it
seldom happens that any candidate receives the exact quota. One or two
candidates may have a thousand votes to spare; this is called a surplus.
Suppose, for instance, that the elected candidate has 1,000 votes over the
quota. He is declared elected and the surplus votes are distributed among
the other candidates according to the expressed second choices on the ballots
or, if machines are used, on the machines. That is, one candidate may be
marked off as second choice on 400 of these ballots, another on 300, a third
on 200, and a fourth 100. These 1,000 extra ballots are more or less picked
at random and it may make a difference which 1,000 are selected. However,
mathematicians say that when thousands or even hundreds of thousands of
votes are transferred, chance is reduced to a negligible factor. After this
transfer has been made the election officials then see if another candidate
has attained the quota. This being done the votes of those who are hope-
lessly out of the running are transferred as in the first instance. However,
no votes are transferred to an elected candidate or to a defeated one. This
process of elimination continues until the nine candidates are elected or until
all but nine are eliminated. This system, as nearly as is possible, makes
every person's vote effective.
It is not necessary that ballots be used in the conduct of an election held
under proportional representation. A machine has been devised which pre-
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The discussion of this method of electing city councilmen takes
on added importance when it is considered that on November 3rd of
this year the people of the city of New York are to vote on two very
important propositions; one, the adoption of a new charter and the
other the choice of proportional representation as the method of elect-
ing members of the city council.2  The question naturally arises as to
the constitutionality of P. R. (which hereafter will be used to indi-
cate proportional representation). This question has been raised in
a number of cases all outside the jurisdiction of the state of New York.
serves all the principles of the system. At the top of this machine the names
of the candidates are listed in alphabetical order. Just below these lists are
revolving dials; these dials contain the names of the candidates in the same
order as they are on the lists. The voter turns the first dial until the name
of his first choice appears, the second dial until his second choice appears
and so on for as many choices as he wishes to express. If the voter wishes
he may write in more choices. When the voter leaves the booth the curtain
rod punches holes in a card to correspond to the choices dialed and clears
the machine for the pext voter. The punched cards fall into a locked box,
which can only be opened at the central counting place, where they are fed
through standard sorting and counting machines at the rate of 400 a minute.
See 26 Searchlight (July, 1936), a pamphlet published by the Citizens Union,
as revised and reprinted for September, 1936. See also Proposed Revised
New York City Charter, c. XLIII, §§ 1001-1010.
It is important to remember that proportional representation does not
mean reapportionmen;t or the rearrangement of Congressional or Senatorial
districts in order to effect a fair representation of districts in accordance with
population.
The need for such a system as the Hare Plan is shown in a study of
Congressional elections in the state of Rhode Island for the year 1922 which
shows the following results: total vote in three Congressional districts-
Democrats, 81,762; Republicans, 73,688. The Democrats elected one Congress-
man, the Republicans two, an evidence of the inequalities of the ward or
single member district system. In the New York City elections for the year
1935, 1,137,000 Democratic votes in the Aldermanic elections elected 62 Alder-
men, 447,000 Republican votes elected 3 Aldermen and 127,000 Socialist and
other votes did not elect any Alderman. Were not these last voters in reality
disfranchised?
Proportional representation is used with great satisfaction everywhere in
the Irish Free State and in parts of Australia, New Zealand and Canada.
The following cities in the United States elect their councils by proportional
representation-Cincinnati, Ohio; Hamilton, Ohio; Toledo, Ohio; Boulder,
Colo.; and Wheeling, W. Va.
Under proportional representation there is no necessity for holding pri-
mary elections, since the choice of the voter is exercised in the election itself;
likewise party emblems are eliminated in general.
'Proposed Revised New York City Charter, c. 43, §§ 1001-1010. Propo-
sition I: "Shall the Charter proposed by the New York City Charter Re-
vision Commission be adopted?" Proposition II: "Shall the system for the
election of Councilmen by proportional representation provided for in the
Charter proposed by the New York City Charter Revision Commission be
adopted?" Proportional representation will take effect only in the event that
the new Charter is adopted, even though it is submitted as a separate propo-
sition. See Matter of Mooney v. Cohen et al., - N. Y. -, - N. E. -,
N. Y. L. J., Oct. 13, 1936 (Act creating the commission held constitutional).
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In the case of Wattles v. Up]ohn et al.3 involving the adoption of the
Hare Plan in the city of Kalamazoo, Mich., the plan was declared
unconstitutional. California likewise has declared it unconstitutional
in the case of People ex rel. Devine v. Elkus.4 In both these cases,
the basis of opposition lay in a very narrow interpretation of the con-
stitutional provisions of both states providing for the right of an elector
to vote at all elections. It was held that since it was impossible for a
voter to exercise as many first choices as there were candidates to be
elected, he was being deprived of a right guaranteed by the state con-
stitution. The Wattles case contains sarcastic dicta as to the compli-
cations of the system. A second ground was advanced in this case
for holding P. R. unconstitutional. This was that the voter was dis-
franchised because he could not predict the destiny of his vote. This
is not possible in any system. Even under the ward or single member
district system one's vote is effective only to the extent that a great
number of others are of the same kind. True, under the Hare plan
there is only one first choice, but the other choices are not automati-
cally ruled out. How effective is a vote for a Democrat in a ward
that is overwhelmingly Republican?
It was by extending the provision concerning the right of an
elector to vote at all elections to include the right to vote for every
officer to be elected that both Michigan and California ruled P. R.
unconstitutional.
Although the case of Reutener v. The City of Cleveland et al.5
upheld the constitutionality of P. R. in the city of Cleveland, it did
not really overrule the Wattles case; and even though the Devine case
was decided after the Reutener case the California court could see no
reason to be governed by it. This is due to the fact that the Reutener
case was hinged about the absolute grant of power given to chartered
cities by the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio constitution." Since
these powers of local self-government were unlimited it was entirely
within the scope of the municipality to provide for the Hare Plan of
P. R. as a means of choosing city councilmen. It was further held
that the mode of elections as well as the personnel of officials were
features of local self-government committed to chartered municipali-
ties. The case of Hile v. The City of Cleveland 7 tested the same
amendment to the city charter as the Reutener case but on the ground
of the authorization of the people of Cleveland to adopt a form of
government different from that prevailing in the different parts of the
state. P. R. was declared constitutional and in addition it was held
'Wattles v. Upjohn et al., 211 Mich. 514, 179 N. W. 335 (1920).
' People ex rel. Devine v. Elkus, 59 Cal. App. 396, 211 Pac. 34 (1922).
'Reutener v. City of Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N. E. 27 (1923).
'OHIO CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 3: "Municipalities shall have authority to
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within
their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are
not in conflict with the general laws."
'Hile v. City of Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 144. 141 N. E. 35 (1923)
Reutener v. City of Cleveland et al., 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N. E. 27 (1923).
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that the Hare Plan did not violate Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution nor did it contravene Section
4, Article 4 of the same.8 A writ of error to the Supreme Court of
the United States was dismissed without opinion on the ground that
no substantial federal question was involved.9
Cases of other states are valuable so far as the constitutional pro-
visions and general laws of those states are similar to ours. Further-
more the fact that under similar provisions, one state Supreme Court
has declared a system unconstitutional is no conclusive indication that
the court of another state will hold to the same effect.
In the first place with reference to the state of New York, the
constitution does contain a provision as to the right of an elector to
vote for all officers that now or hereafter may be elected by the
people.'0 P. R. is not mentioned in the New York constitution nor
is its use prohibited or prescribed. Under the state constitution there
are only two types of officers who are to be elected by a special method.
The governor and the lieutenant governor, for example, must be
elected by a plurality of the votes.'" Members of the Senate and
Assembly are to be elected from single member districts.1 2 There is
no obligation upon the state legislature to grant to every city a par-
ticular kind of voting not made obligatory under the constitution.
In other words, the right to vote is not inherent or natural nor is it
synonymous with the ward system.'3
As to the provision concerning the right to vote for all officers
it might be asked how this is possible under a single district system.
The fact that a citizen of New York can not cast his vote for every
senator or assemblyman has never led anyone to entertain serious
doubts as to its constitutionality.' 4 But simply because under P. R.
the councilmen are elected at large such as in the case of the proposed
New York charter provision,1 wherein each borough constitutes a
single district for the election of councilmen, there is immediate ques-
tioning of its constitutionality. In fact, the opposition is not well
founded; for, *although the voter exercises but one effective first
choice, his other choices are not wasted but go to the electing of other
candidates. Nor is the plurality system affected since under both
'U. S. CONST. Amend. 14, § 1, "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States." U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 4, "The United States shall guarantee to
every State in this Union a Republican form of government." The Ohio
Supreme Court held that what was a republican form of government was a
political and not a judicial question.
'266 U. S. 582, 45 Sup. Ct. 94 (1924).
'o N. Y. CONsT. Art. II, § 1.
"N. Y. CONsT. Art. IV, § 3.
' N. Y. CONST. Art. III, § 2 and § 5.
" Werber v. Hughes, 196 Ind. 542, 148 N. E. 149 (1925) ; In re Walker
River Irr. Dist., 44 Nev. 321, 195 Pac. 327 (1921).
' State ex rel. Guergin v. McAllister, 88 Tex. 284, 21 S. W. 187 (1895).
1 Supra note 2. N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 867, as amended by N. Y. Laws
1935, c. 292.
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methods the candidates who receive the highest number of votes are
elected.
It is well to investigate the right to vote for all officers so as to
determine the intent of the framers of the New York State constitu-
tion, and to arrive at an understanding of its true meaning. This
section was put into the Constitution of 1821 to abolish the property
distinctions of the Constitution of 1777. Under the latter constitu-
tion, the right to vote for state senators was limited to those who
owned freeholds to the value of 100 pounds. Those who had free-
holds to the value of 20 pounds and taxpayers who received a tene-
ment rent of forty shillings a year were entitled to vote for members
of the lower house of the legislature. Section 1, Article 2 of the
Constitution of 1821 ended this discrimination and allowed all who
enjoyed the suffrage to vote on equal terms. And this same provi-
sion remains in the present constitution. 16 Obviously this was not
intended to mean the right to vote for every member of a legislative
body; the single member district method of electing senators and
assemblymen prevented it. It merely enacted that no longer were
there to be those citizens who could vote only for members of the
assembly or those who could vote only for senators. A citizen could
vote for every state officer; governor, lieutenant governor, senator,
assemblyman and all others. He could cast one effective vote for
each one as a separate officer. It never was interpreted to mean that
a citizen was to vote for every senator and assemblyman. The ques-
tion of the intent of the framers of the respective state constitutions
did not receive consideration in the Michigan, California and Ohio
cases.17 If it were the intent of the framers that "for all officers"
should mean "for every candidate for every office to be elected," they
were inconsistent in providing for the single member district elec-
tions of senators and assemblymen.
The fact that P. R. was not in the contemplation of those who
prepared the State Constitution of New York does not infer an im-
plied prohibition of it.' 8 Furthermore, reference must be made to the
Charter Revision Act itself. Under this Act the Mayor of the city
of New York is empowered to appoint a commission to draw up a
new charter which is to regulate matters concerning the property,
affairs and government of the city of New York. In addition, it em-
powers the commission to submit to the electorate of the city a prop-
osition for the adoption of P. R. as a method of electing city council-
men. Since the legislature does not have to devise a special method
" Supra note 10.
"Wattles v. Upjohn et al., 211 Mich. 514, 179 N. W. 335 (1920) ; People
ex rel. Devine v. Elkus, 59 Cal. App. 396, 211 Pac. 34 (1922); Reutener v.
City of Cleveland, 107 Ohio St. 117, 141 N. E. 27 (1923).8 Jenkins v. State Board of Elections of North Carolina, 180 N. C. 169.
104 S. E. 346 (1920): "The fact that the Absentee Voters Law originated
from extraordinary emergencies and was not contemplated by the framers of
the Constitution can make no difference to its validity."
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of election for the city government and does not have to provide for
the same method as is used to elect its members, it may by special
law allow the voters of the city to choose their own method.' 9 Hence
there is no question here of an ultra vires act on the part of the city;
it is merely acting under a special law.
Thus it is seen that under P. R. there is nothing inconsistent
with the plurality system of voting; it does not prevent a voting for all
officers so far as the intendment of that phrase is interpreted; the voter
may vote for each candidate to be elected but with a slight variation of
a serial order under which a vote is really a choice. It is within the
power of a legislature to allow cities to choose their own method of
election so far as secrecy of voting is not destroyed; the legislature
is not compelled to prescribe the single member district system for
the election of city councilmen; and, lastly, P. R. is not expressly nor
impliedly prohibited.20 In view of these facts the case for the con-
stitutionality of P. R. in this state seems plausible.2 1
MICHAEL J. O'REILLY.
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS FOR THE NON-PAYMENT OF ALIMONY-A
CONSIDERATION OF SECTION 1172A OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE ACT.
It has been generally held that contempt proceedings will be
allowed for non-payment of alimony as a remedial process necessary
to secure to the wife an allowance for the support and maintenance
of herself and her children and to prevent them from becoming public
charges.' The necessity for such proceedings justifies its allowance.
1
,N. Y. CONST. Art. XII, §§ 2, 5.
'0 State ex rel. Otto v. Kansas City, 310 Mo. 542, 276 S. W. 389 (1925)
(in which it was held that the departure by Kansas City from the Bicameral
Council was valid, there being no constitutional or statutory provision re-
quiring the council to consist of two houses).
' Commonwealth ex rel. McCormick v. Reeder, 171 Pa. 505, 33 Ati. 67
(1895). In this case an act providing for the election of a given number of
judges notwithstanding the fact that an elector was not allowed to vote for
as many persons as there were places to be filled was held constitutional.
The question of limited voting was raised in two" New York cases. People
ex rel. Wood v. Crissey, 91 N. Y. 616 (1883) ; People ex rel. Watkins v.
Perley, 80' N. Y. 624 (1880) (The question of constitutionality was not
discussed and the case was decided on other grounds.). For a study of
Cincinnati's experience with proportional representation see TAFT CITY AD-
mINISTRATION (2d ed. 1933) pp. 96-110. For an exhaustive study of pro-
portional representation see HOAG AND HALLT, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTA-
TIoN (1926).
1 Ex parte Hall, 125 Ark. 309, 188 S. W. 827 (1916) ; Woodard v. Wood-
ard, 172 Ga. 713, 158 S. E. 569 (1931) ; Heflinger v. Heflinger, 172 Ga. 889,
159 S. E. 242 (1931) ; Toth v. Toth, 242 Mich. 23, 217 N. W. 913, 56 A. L. R.
839 (1928); Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 29 N. E. 826 (1892);
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